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Abstract. The release of synthetic data generated from a model estimated
on the data helps statistical agencies disseminate respondent-level data with
high utility and privacy protection. Motivated by the challenge of dissemi-
nating sensitive variables containing geographic information in the Consumer
Expenditure Surveys (CE) at the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, we pro-
pose two non-parametric Bayesian models as data synthesizers for the county
identifier of each data record: a Bayesian latent class model and a Bayesian
areal model. Both data synthesizers use Dirichlet Process priors to cluster ob-
servations of similar characteristics and allow borrowing information across
observations. We develop innovative disclosure risks measures to quantify
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inherent risks in the original CE data and how those data risks are ame-
liorated by our proposed synthesizers. By creating a lower bound and an
upper bound of disclosure risks under a minimum and a maximum disclosure
risks scenarios respectively, our proposed inherent risks measures provide a
range of acceptable disclosure risks for evaluating risks level in the synthetic
datasets.
Keywords: Data privacy protection, disclosure risks, identification risks,
attribute risks, synthetic data, Bayesian hierarchical models
1 Introduction
The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) utilizes various survey programs
to collect individual-level and business establishment-level data. The Con-
sumer Expenditure Surveys (CE) at the BLS is a survey program focuses on
collecting and publishing information about expenditures, income, and char-
acteristics of consumers in the United States. The CE publishes summary,
domain-level statistics used for both policy-making and research, including
the most widely used measure of inflation - the Consumer Price Index (CPI),
measures of poverty that determine thresholds for the U.S. Governments
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Supplemental Poverty Measure, estimation of the cost of raising a child for
making policies on foster care and child support, and estimation of American
spending on health care, to name a few.
The CE consists of two surveys: i) the Quarterly Interview Survey, which
aims to capture large purchases (such as rent, utilities, and vehicles), contains
approximately 7,000 interviews, and is conducted every quarter; and ii) the
Diary Survey, administered on an annual basis, focuses on capturing small
purchases (such as food, beverages, tobacco), contains approximately 14,000
interviews of households. In this project, we focus on the CE public-use
microdata (PUMD) that result from these instruments. Unlike published
CE tables, which release information from the CE data in aggregated forms,
the CE PUMD releases the CE data at the individual, respondent level,
which potentially enables the CE data users to conduct research tailored
to their interests. Directly releasing individual-level data, however, poses
privacy concerns. Under the U.S. Title 13 and Title 26, released versions of
public-use data are subject to privacy and confidentiality protection. Values
for sensitive variables deemed at high risk for privacy protection are often
suppressed and not reported.
A class of approaches for encoding privacy protection into sensitive vari-
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ables to permit their public release constructs a Bayesian model for the
respondent-level variable(s), estimated on the data, from which new data
are simulated or “synthesized” from the estimated model (Rubin, 1993; Lit-
tle, 1993; Reiter, 2005b,c; Drechsler and Reiter, 2009; Caiola and Reiter,
2010; Kinney et al., 2011; Wang and Reiter, 2012; Paiva et al., 2014; Kinney
et al., 2014; Quick et al., 2015; Wei and Reiter, 2016; Hu et al., 2018). The
new data, commonly called “synthetic data”, are then proposed for release to
the public. The synthetic data generated from flexible models, called synthe-
sizers, should maintain a high level of usefulness (commonly called utility),
while smoothing of the data distribution induced by the model often achieves
a high level of privacy and confidentiality protection.
The current CE PUMD of the Interview Survey contains more than 300
variables about characteristics of the consumer units (CU, i.e. households)
and CU members, and detailed tax, income, and expenditure information
about the CUs and their members. While rich and useful, a set of important
variables about the detailed location of the CUs is not currently released due
to privacy concerns and other considerations. In this paper, we construct
synthesizers for the county labels variable for CUs, along with new disclo-
sure risk measures to ensure adequate privacy protection for synthetically-
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generated county labels, while at the same time ensuring that the synthetic
data are useful to the CE data users for various research purposes of inter-
est to them. Tailored for categorical variables present in the CE data, we
propose two non-parametric Bayesian models as data synthesizers. The first
synthesizer employs a Dirichlet Process mixtures of products of multinomials
(DPMPM), which directly models the county labels variable as a categorical
variable where each county in the data receives a unique code. The second
synthesizer constructs a new, nonparametric version of areal models with
Dirichlet Process priors (DP-areal), which models counts of county labels of
observations sharing similar characteristics, such as gender, income and age
categories.
On utility of the synthetic datasets, we demonstrate and compare the
effectiveness of the proposed DPMPM and DP-areal synthesizers in preserv-
ing important global and local distributional characteristics of the CE data.
On disclosure risks evaluation (i.e. evaluating the risks of disclosure by re-
leasing the synthetic data, as the level of disclosure risks is negatively pro-
portional to privacy protection), we propose new disclosure risks measures
to capture inherent risk in the original, confidential data to help set context
for the reduction in disclosure risks offered by our two candidate synthesiz-
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ers. Specifically, we consider the inherent minimum and maximum disclosure
risks, which give us a lower bound and an upper bound of acceptable dis-
closure risks. The resulting range of acceptable disclosure risks therefore
enables data disseminating agencies to make comparisons of the disclosure
risks between the original data and the synthetic data to facilitate decision
making about synthetic data release.
Section 1.1 introduces details of the CE sample data in the application,
and discusses its features that motivate the development of our synthesizers.
Section 1.2 provides a literature review of synthetic data generation, synthesis
of geographic locations, and review of existing methods of disclosure risks
evaluation.
1.1 The CE data
The CE data sample in our application comes from the 2017 1st quarter In-
terview Survey. There are n = 6,208 consumer units (CU) in this sample. We
focus on 4 variables: gender, income, age, and county. Gender is categorical
in nature, with 2 levels. Income and age are discretized, with 4 levels and 5
levels respectively. These three variables are non-geographic variables. See
Table 1 for details of the variables.
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Table 1: Variables in the CE data sample.
Variable Description
Gender Gender of the reference person; 2 cate-
gories.
Income Imputed and reported income of the CU;
4 categories (based on 4 quartiles).
Age Age of the reference person; 5 categories
(<20, 20-40, 40-60, 60-80, >80).
County County label of the CU; 133 categories.
The county variable represents the county labels of the CUs. As a variable
containing detailed geographic information, it is currently not released in the
CE PUMD for privacy protection. In the 2017 1st quarter CE data sample,
there are 133 counties observed, i.e. 133 counties are sampled. These 133
counties are only a small subset of the total number of counties and county-
equivalents in the US (3,142 counties and county-equivalents in 2018). The
observed 133 counties are scattered around across the nation. Their sparsity
in geographic locations results in the county labels carrying little geographic
information. Therefore, we consider county as a categorical variable with
133 levels. We define a “pattern” as a unique composition of non-geographic
variables, i.e., a pattern is determined by intersection of categories for the
three non-geographic variables {Gender, Income, Age}. The cross tabulation
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of these three non-geographic variables creates 40 different patterns in total
(2× 4× 5 = 40).
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Table 2: List of 40 patterns and numbers of obversations in each pattern. A
pattern is presented as {Gender, Income, Age}.
Index Pattern Observations Index Pattern Observations
1 {1, 1, 1} 27 2 {1, 1, 2} 170
3 {1, 1, 3} 168 4 {1, 1, 4} 194
5 {1, 1, 5} 48 6 {1, 2, 1} 3
7 {1, 2, 2} 193 8 {1, 2, 3} 183
9 {1, 2, 4} 242 10 {1, 2, 5} 61
11 {1, 3, 1} 3 12 {1, 3, 2} 291
13 {1, 3, 3} 275 14 {1, 3, 4} 199
15 {1, 3, 5} 19 16 {1, 4, 1} 4
17 {1, 4, 2} 239 18 {1, 4, 3} 454
19 {1, 4, 4} 169 20 {1, 4, 5} 4
21 {2, 1, 1} 33 22 {2, 1, 2} 229
23 {2, 1, 3} 222 24 {2, 1, 4} 333
25 {2, 1, 5} 128 26 {2, 2, 1} 9
27 {2, 2, 2} 250 28 {2, 2, 3} 254
29 {2, 2, 4} 308 30 {2, 2, 5} 53
31 {2, 3, 1} 8 32 {2, 3, 2} 244
33 {2, 3, 3} 312 34 {2, 3, 4} 184
35 {2, 3, 5} 18 36 {2, 4, 1} 3
37 {2, 4, 2} 198 38 {2, 4, 3} 344
39 {2, 4, 4} 122 40 {2, 4, 5} 10
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As evident in Table 2, the number of observations in every pattern varies
greatly, from the maximum 454 observations in Pattern 18 to the minimum 3
observations in Patterns 6, 11, and 36. The presence of patterns with a small
number of observations motivates us to develop data synthesizers that allow
borrowing information across patterns to strengthen estimation for patterns
with small numbers of observations.
1.2 Literature review
1.2.1 Synthetic data
Depending on the sensitive levels of the variables in a study, agencies can
either generate fully synthetic datasets, where all variables are deemed sen-
sitive, therefore synthesized (Rubin, 1993); or generate partially synthetic
datasets, where only some variables are deemed sensitive and synthesized,
and other variables are un-synthesized (Little, 1993). In the CE data sample,
since only the county label is deemed sensitive, we aim to generate partially
synthetic data where only the county is synthesized. Gender, income, and
age are un-synthesized. The record label is maintained in partially synthetic
data, though the synthesized variable (which is the county label in our CE
application) is generated from the posterior predictive distribution of the
10
synthesizer.
1.2.2 Synthesis of locations
In general, variables containing geographic information are generally deemed
sensitive; however, these variables are extremely helpful for data analysts to
conduct research related to locations. Therefore, a number of researchers
have proposed synthesizers to generate synthetic geographic data.
One stream of work has treated the geographic location as variable(s)
carrying little geographic information, therefore their proposed synthesizers
do not incorporate spatial modeling. Wang and Reiter (2012); Drechsler and
Hu (2018+) developed CART models (Reiter, 2005c) to synthesize continu-
ous longitude and latitude. In addition, Drechsler and Hu (2018+) combined
the continuous longitude and latitude variables into a single categorical geo-
graphic variable, and used versions of categorical CART models for its syn-
thesis. In addition, Drechsler and Hu (2018+) used the DPMPM synthesizer
(Hu et al., 2014) to generate synthetic categorical locations.
Another stream of work has explicitly incorporated spatial modeling in
their synthesizers for densely-observed geographic variables. Paiva et al.
(2014) aggregated counts of geographic locations to a pre-defined grid level,
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modeled the counts through areal level spatial model, which included spatial
random effects with Conditional Autoregressive (CAR) priors (Besag et al.,
1991), then synthesized counts of locations from the estimated model to re-
lease. Quick et al. (2015) developed synthesizers based on Bayesian marked
point process (Liang et al., 2009). Zhou et al. (2010); Quick et al. (2018) de-
veloped differentially smoothing-based synthesizers based on spatially-indexed
distances.
Considering the county labels in the CE data sample, especially the fact
that the observed 133 county labels is only a small subset (a little over
4%) of the total number of 3,142 counties and county-equivalents in the US,
we believe the county labels themselves carry little geographic information.
Therefore, we work with synthesizers that do not incorporate spatial model-
ing. Specifically, we choose the DPMPM synthesizer, and we develop a new,
non-spatial version of the count-based areal synthesizer in Paiva et al. (2014)
with non-spatial, nonparametric priors, labeled as DP-areal synthesizer.
1.2.3 Disclosure risks
Developing appropriate synthesizers allow agencies to generate useful syn-
thetic datasets; however, before the release of synthetic data to the public,
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the data disseminating agencies have to evaluate the level of privacy protec-
tion (or the lack of) provided by the synthetic data. Synthetic data release
takes place only if the synthetic data expresses a sufficient level of privacy
protection. Typically, privacy protection in the synthetic data is determined
by the evaluation of its disclosure risks. The higher the disclosure risks, the
lower the privacy protection, and vice versa.
There are two general categories of disclosure risks in synthetic datasets:
i) identification disclosure risks, and ii) attribute disclosure risks. For par-
tially synthetic data, such as only synthesizing the county labels and keeping
other non-geographic variables un-synthesized in the CE data sample, both
identification disclosure risks and attribute disclosure risks exist (Hu, 2018+).
Identification disclosure risks exist when an intruder has access to infor-
mation about all of the variables for a target record through external files,
and tries to match those values with available information in the released
data to identify the name associated to that record. Widely used measures
for this type of risks are based on Bayesian probabilistic matching (Duncan
and Lambert, 1986, 1989; Lambert, 1993; Reiter, 2005a; Reiter and Mitra,
2009); for example, in the CE data sample, suppose an intruder knows the
particular age, gender and income pattern, as well as the county label, of a
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person named “Betty”. The intruder wants to identify which record in the
CE synthetic data belongs to Betty. Intuitively, the intruder will go through
the synthetic datasets by matching the known pattern, and the synthesized
county label. Suppose record, i, belongs to Betty. Let ci denote the num-
ber of records in the sample sharing the same pattern and the true county
label (in the original data) for record i. Then 1/ci gives a probability of
the intruder randomly and correctly guessing the record attached to Betty
based on matching attribute values. In general, the larger the value of ci,
the lower the identification disclosure risks for record i. If the county label
in the released synthetic data for record i is different from the true label in
the real data, then record i will not be among the ci records, which means
Betty is not among the those records. Let Ti ∈ {0, 1} be a binary indicator
of whether the true match is among the ci records. If the county label in
the synthetic data for Betty’s record, i, is the same as the real data, then
Ti = 1; otherwise, if the county label in the synthetic data for record i is
different from that in the real data, then Ti = 0. If Ti = 1, the intruder
has a 1/ci probability of finding the record belonging to Betty. If Ti = 0,
however, the intruder has a 0 probability of finding the record belonging to
Betty because her record is not among the ci. Therefore, the ratio Ti × 1/ci
14
(or Ti/ci) provides a measure of expected identification match risk for record
i.
In addition to the expected match risks, measures such as the true match
rate (the percentage of true unique matches among target records) and the
false match rate (the percentage of false matches among unique matches)
are also useful (Reiter and Mitra, 2009; Drechsler and Reiter, 2010; Hu and
Hoshino, 2018; Hu, 2018+; Drechsler and Hu, 2018+).
Attribute disclosure risk measures how likely an intruder is to discover
the true value of synthesized variables; in our case the county label. Reiter
(2012); Wang and Reiter (2012); Reiter et al. (2014) proposed a Bayesian
approach to compute a posterior probability of identifying the true attribute
for each record under the synthesizer (Hu et al., 2014; Paiva et al., 2014;
Wei and Reiter, 2016; Hu et al., 2018; Manrique-Vallier and Hu, 2018). This
general framework has the advantages of providing interpretable probability
statements of the attribute disclosure risks (Hu, 2018+). Yet, the procedure
requires that the intruder knows the true attribute values of the synthe-
sized variables for every other record except the target record in order to
make the approach computationally tractable. The approach doesn’t scale
to multiple categorical synthesized variables or a synthesized variables with
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many categories, such as our county label variable (with 133 categories). In
our synthetic CE data application we construct an attribute disclosure risk
measure from our identification risk formulation. Our approach counts the
number of records in the file where the synthesized value matches the true
data value to provide an overall file level summary that contrasts with the
record level statistic in Hu et al. (2014).
Moreover, in the sequel we extend these identification and attribute dis-
closure risk measures in a novel way to capture disclose risks inherent in the
real data, independent of the synthesizers. We create risk measures under a
minimum scenario and a maximum scenario and obtain a lower bound and
an upper bound, respectively. We argue that disclosure risks in the synthetic
datasets may be judged based on how they fit within these bounds.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we
describe the DPMPM synthesizer, the DP-areal synthesizer, and the compu-
tation details of their implementation. Section 3 presents the utility measures
and results of the synthetic CE; Section 4 presents the proposed disclosure
risks measures for the original CE data, and the disclosure risks results of
the synthetic CE data. The paper concludes with discussion in Section 5.
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2 Synthesizers
Our goal is to generate partially synthetic data for the CE data sample of n
= 6,208 observations and p = 4 categorical variables. The variables gender,
income, and age are considered insensitive and un-synthesized, whereas the
county label variable is considered sensitive and synthesized. As discussed
in Section 1.1, the county labels carry little geographic information due to
the small number of observed counties in the CE data sample. Furthermore,
although not all 133 counties are observed within every pattern formed by
{Gender, Income, Age}, it is reasonable to believe that those unobserved
counties among the 133 counties can be sampled in another quarterly CE
data sample. Therefore, the synthesizers for the CE data sample will allow all
133 counties for any pattern, even though some counties are not observed for
some patterns in the sample. In other words, the synthesizers will allow non-
zero probabilities for unobserved combinations of county labels and patterns,
by design. We proceed to describe two models for synthesizing the county
label attribute.
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2.1 Dirichlet Process mixtures of product of multino-
mials (DPMPM)
The DPMPM is a Bayesian version of latent class models for unordered cate-
gorical data. The Dirichlet Process prior allows infinite number of mixtures,
allows the data to learn the effective number of mixture components and pro-
vides support to all distributions of multivariate categorical variables (Dun-
son and Xing, 2009). Si and Reiter (2013) used the DPMPM as a missing
data imputation engine, and Hu et al. (2014) first used it as a synthesizer for
a sample of American Community Survey (ACS). Drechsler and Hu (2018+)
also used the DPMPM synthesizer for simulating geolocations of a German
census.
The description of the DPMPM synthesizer follows that in Hu and Hoshino
(2018). Consider a sample X, that consists of n records, and each record has
p categorical variables. For the CE data, p = 4, including non-geographic
variables (gender, income and age), and geographic variable, the county
label. The basic assumption of the DPMPM is that every record, Xi =
(Xi1, · · · , Xip), i ∈ (1, . . . , n), belongs to one of K underlying latent classes,
which is unobserved, thus latent. Given the latent class assignment zi ∈
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(1, . . . , K) of record i, as in Equation (2), the value for record i and attribute,
j ∈ (1, . . . , p), Xij, independently follows its own Multinomial distribution,
as in Equation (1). dj denotes the number of categories of variable j.
Xij | zi, θ ind∼ Multinomial(1; θ(j)zi1, . . . , θ(j)zidj) for all i, j (1)
zi | pi ∼ Multinomial(1;pi1, . . . , piK) for all i (2)
The DPMPM clusters records with similar characteristics based on all
p attributes. Relationships among these p categorical attributes are in-
duced by integrating out the latent class assignment zi. To empower the
DPMPM to pick the effective number of occupied latent classes, the trun-
cated stick-breaking representation (Sethuraman, 1994) is used as in Equa-
tion (3) through Equation (6),
pik = βk
∏
l<k
(1− βl) for k = 1, . . . , K (3)
βk
iid∼ Beta(1, α) for k = 1, . . . , K − 1, βK = 1 (4)
α ∼ Gamma(aα, bα) (5)
θ
(j)
k = (θ
(j)
k1 , . . . , θ
(j)
kdj
) ∼ Dirichlet(a(j)1 , . . . , a(j)dj ). (6)
and a blocked Gibbs sampler is implemented for the Markov chain Monte
19
Carlo sampling procedure (Ishwaran and James, 2001; Si and Reiter, 2013;
Hu et al., 2014; Drechsler and Hu, 2018+).
To generate synthetic county label of each record using the DPMPM
synthesizer, we first generate sample values of (pi(`), α(`), θ(c)(`)) from the pos-
terior distribution , where θ(c)(`) contains the sample values of the county
label variable at MCMC iteration `. We can generate the vector of latent
class assignments {z(`)i , i = 1, · · · , n} through a Multinomial draw with the
samples of pi(`), as in Equation (1). We next generate synthetic county label,
{X(`)ic , i = 1, · · · , n}, through a Multinomial draw with samples of θ(c)(`), as
in Equation (2). Let Z(`) denote a partially synthetic dataset at MCMC it-
eration `. Then we repeat the process for m times, creating m independent
partially synthetic datasets Z = (Z(1), · · · ,Z(m)).
2.2 Areal models with Dirichlet Process prior on ran-
dom effect (DP-areal)
The DP-areal synthesizer is built upon areal level spatial models, also known
as disease mapping models (Clayton and Kaldor, 1987; Besag et al., 1991;
Clayton and Bernardinelli, 1992). Paiva et al. (2014) developed extensions
of the areal level spatial models as engines to generate simulated locations.
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Specifically, they i) created pre-defined areal based on non-geographic vari-
ables, ii) aggregated counts of geographic locations to the pre-defined areal,
iii) estimated areal level spatial models that predict observed, areal-level
counts with spatial random effects using a Conditional Autoregressive (CAR)
prior, and iv) simulated new locations for each individual from the estimated
models. Crucial to the setup in Paiva et al. (2014) are the pre-defined pat-
terns formed by the intersection of non-arial attributes. Recall that a pattern
for the CE sample is determined by the composition of {Gender, Income,
Age}, and there are 40 patterns in the CE data.
However, as discussed before, due to the little geographic information
carried in county labels in the CE data as a result of the geographic sparsity
of county labels, the use of spatial random effects and CAR priors on them
in Paiva et al. (2014) is not appropriate. Instead, we include non-spatial
random effects from other sources and specify Dirichlet Process (DP) priors
for them in our application. We now turn to the description of our DP-areal
synthesizer.
Let b denote a unique pattern of non-geographic variables, and b =
1, . . . , B, where B is the total number of unique patterns (B = 40 in the
CE data). Let c
(b)
i be the count of observations in county i within pattern b.
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When there is no observation of a particular county i for pattern b, zeros are
inserted so that c
(b)
i = 0. For clarity, we reserve the word “combination” for
non-geographic variables and the geographic attribute county label, and the
word “pattern” for only the non-geographic variables.
c
(b)
i ∼ Poisson(λ(b)i ) (7)
log λ
(b)
i ∼ Normal(µ+ θ∗z(b)i +
R∑
r=1
φ∗
z
(b)
i r
X
(b)
i,r ,
1
τλ
) (8)
z
(b)
i | pi ∼ Multinomial(1;pi1, · · · , piK) (9)
In the regression in Equation (8), µ is the overall intercept for log(λ
(b)
i ),
the logarithm of Poisson rate for county i and pattern b. This set-up specifies
a Poisson-lognormal model where precision parameter, τλ, allows for over-
dispersion. Note that we let r = 1, · · · , R, where R = ∑pj=1 dj, represents
the total sum of the number of categories of all non-geographic categorical
variables. Subsequently, X
(b)
i is an R× 1 vector comprising ones at positions
X
(b)
i,r (the attribute values at positions for all non-geographic attributes in
pattern b) and zeros elsewhere.
Two types of random effects are considered: i) combination-specific ran-
dom effect, denoted by θ∗, and ii) county-specific and variable-specific ran-
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dom effect, denoted by φ∗. To adequately model these random effects, the
truncated DP priors are specified on θ’s and φ’s to allow flexible clustering
counties of similar characteristics. Here, z
(b)
i ∈ (1, . . . , K), denotes the cluster
indicator for each combination, (i, b). Then, θ∗
z
(b)
i
represents the combination-
specific random effect, where all combinations in the same mixture compo-
nent (i.e. when z
(b)
i = z
(b′)
j = k) share the same unique random effect value
or “location”, θ∗k. Similarly, φ
∗
z
(b)
i r
is a county-specific and value-specific ran-
dom effect, where all counties in the same mixture component (i.e., when
z
(b)
i = z
(b′)
j = k) share the same random effect, φ
∗
kr. The cluster assignment,
z
(b)
i , for each combination is generated from a Multinomial draw with cluster
probabilities, pi1, · · · , piK in Equation (9) with cluster-indexed coefficients or
locations, given by (θ∗k, (φ
∗
kr)r=1,...,R)k=1,...,K . Moreover, the total number of
mixture components or clusters is truncated at K. The current truncated
mixture model becomes arbitrarily close to a Dirichlet process mixture as
K →∞ in Equation (9).
We use the truncated stick-breaking representation for the prior distribu-
tion of pi (Sethuraman, 1994). We specify i.i.d. normal priors for θ∗’s and
multivariate normal priors for locations, φ∗’s, and a univariate normal prior
for the overall mean µ.
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θ∗k
iid∼ Normal(0, 1/τθ) (10)
(φ∗k1, · · · , φ∗kR) ∼ MultivariateNormalR(µφ,Σφ) (11)
µ ∼ Normal(0, 1/τµ) (12)
To generate the synthetic county label of each record, we follow the gen-
eral approach of Paiva et al. (2014). At MCMC iteration l, we, firstly, gather
all records with the same pattern. Secondly, we collect all the λ
(b)
i,l ’s from the
unique combination of pattern b and the county i. Thirdly, we compute
p
(b)
i,` = λ
(b)
i,` /
G∑
i=1
λ
(b)
i,` , (13)
where G is the number of all county labels within pattern b (e.g. G = 133 in
the CE data). Finally, we take a Multinomial draw with sample size 1,
Sh,` ∼ Multinomial(1; p(b)1,`, · · · , p(b)G,`), (14)
where Sh,` is the random variable representing the county label of record
h, h ∈ (1, . . . , c(b)i ). We repeat this process for all records in the sample,
creating a partially synthetic dataset Z(`). Then the entire process is re-
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peated for m times, creating m independent partially synthetic datasets,
Z = (Z(1), · · · ,Z(m)).
2.3 Computation
Computation of the DPMPM synthesizer is done by the NPBayesImpute R
package. We run the DPMPM synthesizer on the CE sample for 10,000
iterations with 5,000 burn-in. We follow the recommendations of Dunson
and Xing (2009); Si and Reiter (2013); Hu et al. (2014); Drechsler and Hu
(2018+) and set aα = bα = 0.25, and set uninformative priors for θ by
a
(j)
1 = · · · = a(j)dj = 1 for j = 1, · · · , p. We set K = 40 and track the number
of occupied latent classes with 95% interval (28, 36), indicating K = 40 is
sufficiently large. We generate m = 20 synthetic datasets by using parameters
in iterations that are far away from each other to guarantee independence.
We label the m = 20 synthetic datasets generated by the DPMPM synthesizer
as ZDPMPM .
Computation of the DP-areal synthesizer is done using Stan programming
language (Stan Development Team, 2016). We ran the DP-areal synthesizer
on the CE sample for 4,000 iterations with 2,000 burn-in. Since Rstan employ
a Hamiltonian Monte Carlo sampler that suppresses the usual random walk
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behavior of the Metropolis-Hastings sampler, posterior sampling iterations
are far less correlated than under a Gibbs sampler, which permits use of
far fewer iterations. We set aα = bα = 1, and specify Gamma(1, 1) prior
distributions for τθ, τφ, τµ, and τλ. For the multivariate covariance matrix Σφ
in the prior distribution for φ∗’s, we decompose Σφ = (Iσφ)Ωφ(Iσφ), into the
R× 1 vector of variances, σφ that are diagonalized into an R×R matrix in
Iσφ), and an R × R correlation matrix, Ωφ. We select a truncated t(3, 0, 1)
prior distribution for the components of σφ. We choose the LKJ(ν = 2) prior
distribution for Ωφ, which has a single hyperparameter, ν, that controls how
tightly the prior distribution is centered on the identity matrix (meaning
independence). We select ν = 2, which denotes a uniform distribution over
the space of correlation matrices, which is the most weakly informative prior
possible, such that we let the data learn the values. We set K = 50, and
generate m = 20 synthetic datasets. They are labeled as ZDP−areal.
3 Utility measure
When synthetic microdata is released to the public, data analysts would use
it to conduct inferences based on their research interests. Useful synthetic
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data would provide high quality inference results, as if the data analysts had
access to the original and confidential data. The level of quality depends on
the level of closeness between the inference results from the original data and
from the synthetic data, respectively.
Measures of the level of such closeness, commonly referred to as utility
measures, are therefore needed to evaluate the usefulness of the synthetic
data. We focus on measuring the preservation of distributional characteris-
tics of the synthetic data in the synthetic datasets. Since only the county
labels are synthesized in the synthetic CE data, we examine the preservation
of the distributional characteristics of the county label, and its relationships
with other un-synthesized variables. We do so by conducting the same anal-
ysis on the original dataset, and on ZDPMPM (synthetic datasets generated
from the DPMPM synthesizer) and ZDP−areal (synthetic datasets generated
from the DP-areal synthesizer) and compare results to the original data, for
context. Since we have defined patterns in the CE data, we will consider two
categories of utility measures: i) globally utility measure, which focuses on
the distributional characteristics of county label and its relationships with
other variables at the file level; and ii) within pattern utility measure, which
focuses on the distributional characteristics of county label at the pre-defined
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Table 3: Sum of deviations for each ol one-way, two-way, and three-way tables
of the synthetic datasets ZDPMPM and ZDP−areal from those of the original
dataset X. Results are averages of m = 20 partially synthetic datasets,
divided by 100 for readability.
Table DPMPM DP-areal
one-way 9.087 17.105
two-way 47.908 64.165
three-way 80.826 88.843
pattern level.
3.1 Global utility measure
We proceed to formulate measures of utility for our two synthesizers based
on a typical manner in which data analysts use the CE data. In the CE data,
three non-geographic variables (gender, income, and age) and one geographic
variable (county label) are all constructed to be categorical. Furthermore,
only the county label is synthesized. It is therefore useful to calculate one-
way, two-way, and three-way tables of counts of observations for the entire
file, and compare these computed counts from the original data, to those
from the synthetic datasets. Comparing the accuracy of the synthetic data
in reproducing table counts provides a deviance measure of the synthetic
datasets from the original dataset. Since these tables are constructed for the
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entire files consisting all records, this utility measure is regarded as global
utility measure.
Without loss of generality, let Z denote the m synthetic datasets gener-
ated from a synthesizer and X be the original CE data (that is kept confi-
dential and not released to the public).
For one-way tables, we compute the counts of observations of the 133 cat-
egories of county label in X, as well as the counts of observations of the 133
categories of county label in Z(`), ` = 1, . . . ,m. We next calculate the differ-
ences in the counts between the original and synthetic datasets, and report
the sum of the absolute differences to avoid cancellation of positive and nega-
tive differences. This process is repeated for every Z(`), ` = 1, · · · ,m. For the
two-way tables, we compute the counts of observations in the contingency ta-
bles formed by county label and another non-geographic variable and follow
the same procedure as for the one-way tables. Similarly for the three-way
tables, counts of observations in the contingency tables formed by county
label and two other non-geographic variables are computed in X and Z(`).
Table 3 gives summary of absolute deviance of the synthetic data from the
original data. Results are averages of m = 20 partially synthetic datasets,
with results on ZDPMPM in column DPMPM, and results on ZDP−areal in
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Figure 1: One-way table of deviation, DPMPM vs DP-areal.
column DP-areal. These summaries show that the DPMPM synthesizer pro-
duces smaller absolute deviance than the DP-areal synthesizer, especially in
the one-way and two-way tables.
Figure 1, Figure 2a, and Figure 2b visualize the one-way, two-way and
three-way deviations in all m = 20 synthetic datasets through density plots.
The actual deviations, not the absolute deviations, are plotted. Especially
evident in Figure 1, the one-way deviation in ZDPMPM is more concentrated
around 0 than that in ZDP−areal, indicating less overall deviation of the
synthetic datasets generated by the DPMPM synthesizer from the original
dataset. The findings are in accordance with Table 3, showing higher level of
preservation of distributional characteristics of county label (i.e. the utility
of the synthetic data) by the DPMPM synthesizer than that by the DP-areal
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Figure 2: Two-way and three-way tables of deviation, DPMPM vs DP-areal.
synthesizer. The DP-areal synthesizer, nevertheless, produces good utility.
The density plots of actual deviations in two-way and three-way tables in
Figure 2a and Figure 2b show better utility performance of the DPMPM
synthesizer, overall, although the differences in performance is smaller com-
pared to one-way tables. Overall, the global utility evaluation shows higher
utility for synthetic data generated by the DPMPM synthesizer than that by
the DP-areal synthesizer, though the utility of both synthesizers is good.
3.2 Within pattern utility measure
Another approach for evaluating the synthetic data utility is to compare the
induced distributions over the county labels within each pattern to the dis-
tribution in the original data. Recall that we define a pattern as a unique
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Figure 3: Counties in Pattern 1 to Pattern 4.
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composition of non-geographic variables, as {Gender, Income, Age}, and
there are 40 patterns in the CE data sample. Since the partially synthetic
CE datasets have only the county label synthesized, evaluating the preserva-
tion of distributional characteristics of county label within each pattern is of
particular interest. This utility measure is within pattern, or local.
To visualize the distribution of county label within each pattern, and the
preservation of its distribution by the DPMPM synthesizer and the DP-areal
synthesizer, we plot density plots of these three distributions and put them
on the same graph. In Figure 3: the red curve represents the original data
distribution of observed county labels, the green curve represents the distri-
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bution of synthetic county labels by the DPMPM synthesizer, and the blue
curve represents the distribution of synthetic county labels by the DP-areal
synthesizer. The green and blue curves are based on one of m = 20 synthetic
dataset generated by the two synthesizers respectively for readability and
brevity. Plots based on remaining synthetic datasets show similar results.
For brevity, density plots in Pattern 1 to Pattern 4 are included in the main
text. The remaining 36 density plots are presented in a Supplement.
Overall, in most of the patterns, the distribution of county label in syn-
thetic datasets generated by the DP-areal synthesizer (blue curve) is closer
to that of the original data (red curve), than is the distribution generated
by the DPMPM synthesizer (green curve). The DPMPM better reproduces
peaked behavior in the original data distribution, while the DP-areal model
induces more smoothing. The DPMPM also better reproduces local features
in the county label distribution that are smoothed over by the DP-areal.
Both synthesizers, however, induce an equally high degree of smoothing in
patterns with a small number of observations/records.
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4 Disclosure risks measure
As we have seen in Section 3, the DPMPM and the DP-areal synthesizers
induce smoothing in the distribution of the county label as compared to the
original data, both globally and within each pattern. The induced smoothing
attempts to maintain the utility of the synthetic data, making it useful to
data analysts for their analysis interests. At the same time, the induced
smoothing provides privacy protection in the synthetic data. With county
labels synthesized in the CE data, an intruder can no longer know the true
category of the synthesized county label of any record. Moreover, she can no
longer know the identification of any record with 100% certainty, even though
she could have access to the un-synthesized pattern (gender, age, and income)
of that record. Nevertheless, an intruder could still make guesses about the
true category of the synthesized county label, and make guesses about the
identity of any record, using un-synthesized variables that might be available
to her. The first type of risk, where the intruder seeks the value of the county
label for a record, is commonly known as attribute disclosure. The second
type of risk, where the intruder seeks the identity of a record, is commonly
referred to as identification disclosure. We proceed to construct measures for
attribute and identification disclosure risks.
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Typically, both types of disclosure risks are measured for the simulated
synthetic datasets, indicating level of protection (or the lack of) by the re-
lease of synthetic data. If multiple synthesizers have been proposed, as in
our current application for synthetic CE data, evaluations of disclosure risks
measures and their comparisons could inform the CE program about which
synthesizer provides higher privacy protection. In the final analysis, the data
disseminating agencies, such as the CE program, are able to make a deci-
sion among the synthesizers through evaluating their relative usefulness (i.e.
utility measures) and the level of privacy protection that they encode (i.e.
the disclosure risk measures). If disclosure risk measures can be developed
for the original data, agencies will have much more information when de-
ciding among synthesizers based on not only comparison of their disclosure
risk measures to each other, but also on comparison to those in the original
data. We next describe our general approach to measure disclosure risks in
the original data.
4.1 Inherent disclosure risks in the CE data
A synthesizer replaces the county label for every record in the original data
with a synthesized value. In the limit as a synthesizer becomes more accu-
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rate, the best synthesizer may be imagined as one that generates the syn-
thesized values of the county label for all records by using the original data
distribution. We label this type of synthesizer that uses the original data dis-
tribution as “perfect”. Generating synthetic values under the original data
distribution is both independent of any synthesizing model and may produce
synthesized values that differ from the original data. A perfect synthesizer
provides the highest possible utility, because there is no deviation from the
original data distribution; however, it increases disclosure risks at the same
time. Although the original data is not released to the public, as data dis-
seminators, we can use it to construct maximum disclosure risks measures
and create an upper bound of the acceptable disclosure risks.
To mimic the behavior of an intruder with the highest amount of infor-
mation (i.e. the exact distribution of county label), we can sample a new
draw of the county label for every record based on its original distribution
within each pattern. We approximate the distribution of county labels in
the original data with the empirical distribution, which we sample under a
weighted re-sampling scheme. Given this set of newly sampled county labels,
we can then calculate the identification disclosure risks and attribute disclo-
sure risks. We repeat this process for a large number of times, and obtain
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sampling distributions of two types of disclosure risks, fully capturing the
variability in the sampling processes. Disclosure risks computed based on
this repeated sampling procedure provide an upper abound of the acceptable
disclosure risks, because this procedure uses maximum amount of informa-
tion that may be published - the original data distribution. Therefore, we
label this scenario as the maximum disclosure risks scenario.
By contrast, we may establish a lower bound on the risk that may be
achieved by a synthesizer. This requires us to go to the other extreme, where
an intruder has the least amount of information about the distribution of
the county label in the original data. We employ a uniform distribution
over among all possible county labels within each pattern as the minimally-
informative scenario; i.e., we can sample a new draw of the county label of
every record from a uniform distribution over the 133 observed county la-
bels within each pattern in the CE data sample. Given this set of newly
sampled county labels, identification and attribute disclosure risks can be
calculated, and this process is repeated for a large number of times to ob-
tain the sampling distributions of two types of disclosure risks. Because this
repeated sampling procedure uses the minimum amount of information, dis-
closure risks computed based on this procedure provide a lower bound of
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the acceptable disclosure risks, and we label this scenario as the minimum
disclosure risks scenario. Similar to the maximum disclosure risks scenario,
the minimum scenario is a type of risk that is inherent in the original dataset
and independent of the synthesizer.
4.2 Identification disclosure risks
4.2.1 Three summaries of identification disclosure probabilities
Identification disclosure risks measure how likely it is for an intruder to cor-
rectly identify (e.g the name of) a record by matching with available infor-
mation from external files. In our current application, the released synthetic
datasets contain three un-synthesized variables (gender, age, and income),
and one synthesized variable (county label). Suppose an intruder has ac-
cess to an external file that includes gender, age and county label of every
record, as well as their identities. The attribute values, but not the identity
of the records, also appear in the released synthetic datasets. With access to
such external information, the intruder may attempt to identify a record by
performing matches within each pattern. The matching is performed within
pattern because the intruder knows the values of the pattern attribute value
are not synthesized.
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Without loss of generality, assume that the intruder has external infor-
mation about every record’s gender, age and county label. Let ci be the
number of records with the highest match probability for record, i (i.e. the
number of records having the exact same values of gender, age, and county
label as record i in the original data); let Ti = 1 if the true match is among
the ci units and Ti = 0, otherwise. We recall that Ti will be set to 1 if the
synthesized value for the county label for record, i, is the same as that for the
original data. Let Ki = 1 when ciTi = 1 and Ki = 0 otherwise (i.e., Ki = 1
indicates a true unique match exists), and let n denote the total number of
target records (i.e. every record in the CE data). Finally, let Fi = 1 when
ci(1 − Ti) = 1 and Fi = 0 otherwise (i.e., Fi = 1 indicates a false unique
match), and let s equal the number of records with ci = 1 (i.e. the number
of records that are uniquely matched among n target records). There are
three widely used file-level summaries of identification disclosure probabili-
ties using the notations and definitions given above (Reiter and Mitra, 2009;
Drechsler and Reiter, 2010; Hu and Hoshino, 2018; Hu, 2018+; Drechsler and
Hu, 2018+).
39
(i) The expected match risk:
n∑
i=1
Ti
ci
. (15)
When Ti = 1 and ci > 1, the contribution of unit i to the expected
match risk reflects the intruder randomly guessing at the correct match
from the ci candidates, where the intruder probability of a correct guess
is 1/ci. In general, the higher the expected match risk, the higher the
identification disclosure risks.
(ii) The true match rate:
n∑
i=1
Ki
n
, (16)
which is the percentage of true unique matches among the target records.
In general, the higher the true match rate, the higher the identification
disclosure risks.
(iii) The false match rate:
n∑
i=1
Fi
s
, (17)
which is the percentage of false matches among unique matches. In
general, the lower the false match rate, the higher the identification
disclosure risks.
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When evaluating the identification disclosure risks under the maximum
disclosure risks scenario, we repeatedly conduct a weighted draw from the
133 counties within each pattern, given its original distribution under an
empirical distribution approximation. For a record, i, we first gather all
records sharing the same pattern with record i, i.e., all records with the
same (gender, age, income) composition. Secondly, we generate a new county
label for record, i, from the original distribution of the county labels of all
records with the same pattern. This process is done for every record to obtain
a new “synthetic” dataset with synthetic county labels updated according
to its original distribution. Thirdly, we compute the three summaries of
the identification risk probabilities for this “synthetic” dataset. In the end,
we perform Steps 1 through 3 for a large number of times, and sampling
distributions of expected risk, true match rate, and false match rate. For the
minimum disclosure risks scenario, keep Steps 1 and 3 and change Step 2 to
generate a new county label for record i from a uniform distribution from 1
to 133.
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4.2.2 Results
When performing matching with external files, there are different assump-
tions about the intruder’s knowledge of the un-synthesized variables. We
consider three cases of assumption of intruder’s knowledge, encoded in col-
umn Known in Table 4: i) only gender; ii) gender and age; iii) gender, age,
and income. We collapse across patterns in case iii) to achieve case ii) and
case i). We would expect identification risks to be generally lower as we
collapse across patterns since ci would be expected to increase. Such is not
always the case, however, as we observe for the DP-areal results, presented
below.
For each of the three cases, we report summaries of expected risk, true
match rate, and false match rate of identification disclosure risks. The column
DPMPM reports average summaries of m = 20 synthetic datasets, ZDPMPM
generated by the DPMPM synthesizer. The column DP-areal reports average
summaries ofm = 20 synthetic datasets, ZDP−areal generated by the DP-areal
synthesizer. The column Max reports average summaries of S = 100 repeated
sampling under the maximum identification disclosure risks scenario. We
exclude the column Min for brevity, and it has 0 for expected risk and true
match rate for all cases, and NaN for false match rate for all cases (due to
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s = 0, i.e. no unique matches, in the denominator).
A subtle point about the Max for the false match rate is that because of
the definition of the false match rate (the percentage of false matches among
unique matches; and higher false match rate means lower privacy protection),
the computed identification risk measures in the Max column is actually the
lower bound of the acceptable range of false match rate; however, the Max
for the expected risk and the true match rate serve as upper bounds, as
discussed before.
As evident in Table 4, for every case of assumption of intruder’s knowl-
edge, summaries of identification disclosure risks indicate significantly lower
expected risk in synthetic data generated by the DP-areal synthesizer. As the
intruder’s knowledge increases, the expected risk in the DPMPM synthetic
data increases and approaches to the Max, while the expected risk in the
DP-areal synthetic data slightly decreases. On average, expected risk in the
DPMPM synthetic data and the DP-areal synthetic data is bounded below by
Min and bounded above by Max. The results of the true match rate and the
false match rate show much smaller difference between the two synthesizers
and between each synthesizer with the Max. Overall the DPMPM synthe-
sizer and the DP-areal synthesizer has 0 or close to 0 true match rate, and 1
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or close to 1 false match rate, suggesting high level of privacy protection.
To take a closer look at the expected risk, consider case iii) where ex-
act matching is done assuming intruder’s knowledge of gender, age, and in-
come. Recall that there are n = 6, 208 observations in the CE sample. For
the DPMPM synthetic datasets, an average 29.466 expected risk indicates
a record-level average 0.00475 expected risk when dividing by n. The cor-
responding record-level average expected risk from the DP-areal synthetic
datasets is 0.00014, and that from the S = 100 repeated sampling under the
maximum risk scenario is 0.00606. Overall, the expected risk is very low
with both synthesizers, and it is low even under the maximum risk scenario,
which suggests low inherent identification disclosure risks in the original CE
data.
To visualize the variability among the summaries of m = 20 synthetic
datasets for each of ZDPMPM and ZDP−areal, Figure 4 presents a histogram of
S = 100 repeated samples of the expected risk under the maximum disclosure
risks scenario is plotted. In addition, the minimum, mean, and maximum
expected risk among m = 20 DPMPM synthetic datasets (dashed and blue)
and those among m = 20 DP-areal synthetic datasets (dotted and red) are
also co-plotted. Hidden in the average summaries of expected risk in Table 4
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is that although the average expected risk among m = 20 synthetic datasets
ZDPMPM is smaller than the average upper bound formed by the average ex-
pected risk among S = 100 repeated samples under the maximum disclosure
risks scenario, the expected risk computed for the DPMPM synthetic dataset
(dashed and blue) shows significant overlap with the expected risk computed
for repeatedly sampled “synthetic” datasets under the maximum disclosure
risks scenario (filled histogram). The maximum expected risk among m = 20
DPMPM synthetic datasets appears to be larger than expected risk for al-
most half of “synthetic” datasets under the maximum disclosure risks sce-
nario, which may be cause for concern about DPMPM synthetic datasets.
By contrast, the variability in expected risk among m = 20 DP-areal syn-
thetic datasets (dotted and red) is much smaller, and the expected risk for
the DP-areal synthetic dataset is overall much smaller than those computed
under the maximum disclosure risks scenario, as shown in Table 4, suggesting
acceptable identification disclosure risks in DP-areal synthetic datasets. Sim-
ilar plots for cases i) gender and ii) gender and age of intruder’s knowledge
assumptions suggest overall acceptable identification disclosure risks for both
the DPMPM and the DP-areal synthesizers, which agree with the average
summaries in Table 4. The plots are placed in a Supplement for brevity.
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Figure 4: Histogram of expected risks under the maximum risk scenario.
Vertical lines include the min, mean, and max among the m = 20 synthetic
datasets.
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Table 4: Expected risk, true match rate, and false match rate of identi-
fication disclosure risks of the synthetic datasets. Results are averages of
m = 20 partially synthetic datasets for the columns DPMPM and DP-areal,
and averages of S = 100 repeated sampling iterations for the Min column.
(*computed based on non s = 0 cases)
Known Summary DPMPM DP-areal Max
gender expected risk 2.497 0.952 4.708
true match rate 0.000 0 0.000
false match rate 0.997 1* 0.989
gender, expected risk 10.474 0.851 20.073
and age true match rate 0.000 0.000 0.001
false match rate 0.991 1.000 0.978
gender, expected risk 29.466 0.755 38.295
age, true match rate 0.001 0.000 0.002
and income false match rate 0.991 1.000 0.984
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4.3 Attribute disclosure risks
4.3.1 The summary of exact attribute disclosure risks
Attribute disclosure risks measure how likely it is for an intruder to correctly
infer the true value of a synthesized variable or attribute in the original
data from the synthetic datasets. Such attacks usually make use of all un-
synthesized attributes, therefore we only consider the case where the intruder
uses the available pattern of each record (i.e. gender, age, and income),
to infer the true county label in the original dataset. That is, we assume
gender, age and income are available when mimicking the intruder’s behavior
to conduct attribute attacks. Let Ai = 1 if the synthesized county label
category is the same as the original county label for record i, and Ai = 0,
otherwise (i.e., Ai = 1 indicates an exact attribute disclosure). The number
of exact attribute disclosures is
n∑
i=1
Ai. (18)
We note that some attribute disclosure risks for variables containing geo-
graphic information proposed in previous works focus on distance between
the synthesized location and the true location. For every record, Wang and
Reiter (2012) reported a Euclidean distance R1 between the intruder’s guess
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of the longitude and latitude and the actual longitude and latitude, and then
reported the count R2 recording the number of actual cases in circle centered
at the actual longitude and latitude with radius R1. Paiva et al. (2014) re-
ported a Euclidean distance measure between the true location yi and the
guess y∗ with the maximum posterior probability of record i. Because the
county label in the CE data sample is treated as categorical, and moreover
because of little geographic information this variable carries, as discussed in
Section 1.1, measuring a Euclidean distance between the true county label
and the synthesized county label for record i is not feasible. We, therefore
only consider the number of exact attribute disclosures in Equation (18). Our
measure for attribute risk is composed as the sum of exact attribute disclo-
sures for all records, and an exact attribute disclosure for record i is declared
when the synthesized county label category is the same as the county label
category in the original data. We construct our definition for attribute risks
to be consistent with that for identification risks, where both produce file-
level measures of risk designed to help reporting agencies assess the overall
risk associated with the potential release of the synthetic data. The same
procedure is used to generate minimum and maximum attribute disclosure
risks as for the identification disclosure risks.
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4.3.2 Results
The first row of Table 5 presents the average numbers of exact attribute dis-
closures among m = 20 DPMPM synthetic datasets ZDPMPM , and the same
for ZDP−areal, in the DPMPM and DP-areal columns, respectively. It also
reports the average numbers of exact attribute disclosures among S = 100
repeated sampling iterations under the minimum disclosure risks scenario,
and among S = 100 repeated sampling iterations under the maximum dis-
closure risks scenario, in the Min and Max columns respectively. The second
row presents corresponding percentages of exact attribute disclosures, by di-
viding the values in the first row with n = 6, 208. These results show that,
on average, the numbers of exact attribute disclosures in both the DPMPM
synthetic data and in the DP-areal synthetic data are generally far away from
the maximum scenario, with the latter lower than the former, consistent with
results for identification disclosures risk. The inherent risks in the original
data are not high when given the maximum amount of information, while it
is not zero when given the minimum amount of information.
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Table 5: The average numbers and percentages of of exact attribute disclo-
sures. Results are averages of m = 20 partially synthetic datasets for the
columns DPMPM and DP-areal, and averages of S = 100 repeated sampling
iterations for the Min and Max columns.
Summary Min DPMPM DP-areal Max
Number of exact attribute disclosures 47.25 115.25 88.15 175.33
Percentage of exact attribute disclosures 0.76% 1.86% 1.42% 2.82%
Figure 5: Histogram of the number of exact attribute disclosures under the
maximum risk scenario. Vertical lines include the min, mean, and max among
the m = 20 synthetic datasets.
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Figure 5 plots one histogram of exact attribute disclosures based on
S = 100 iterations of repeated sampling under the minimum disclosure
risks scenario (green), and another histogram under the maximum disclo-
sure risks scenario (red). Additionally, vertical lines of the results from the
DPMPM synthetic datasets (dashed and blue) and from the DP-areal syn-
thetic datasets (dotted and red) are plotted to show comparisons. Each set of
three vertical lines correspond to the minimum, the mean, and the maximum
of the number of exact attribute disclosures among the m = 20 synthetic
datasets. Figure 5 agrees with the results in Table 5, showing that when
considering the variability in sampling, the DP-areal synthetic datasets have
generally lower attribute disclosure risks comparing to the DPMPM synthetic
datasets, and both are well below the maximum disclosure risk scenarios.
5 Conclusion
We devised an end-to-end process for data synthesis, including formulating
data synthesizers and measuring and comparing their utilities and disclosure
risks in a fashion that promotes ease-of-interpretation to facilitate decision
making by statistical agencies who may consider the release of respondent-
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level synthetic data. Our data synthesizers are constructed for the challeng-
ing case of generating geographic location labels. Our formulations replace
spatial priors with more general nonparametric prior formulations due to geo-
graphic sparsity, with the result that they may broadly apply to the synthesis
of any polytomous variable characterized by multiple levels. We leveraged
the patterns formed from the intersection of known categorical variables to
define a new local utility measure based on the distribution of the synthesized
county label that makes intuitive the comparisons of usefulness among the
synthesizers. We designed new minimum and maximum risk measures that
characterize the data and are independent of the choice of synthesizer. These
minimum and maximum risk bounds set context for evaluating the relative
improvements in privacy protection provided by the synthesizers in a way
that aids the agency decision-maker to evaluate whether synthetic data is
sufficiently privacy protected for release.
An opportunity for future work is to construct a simple mechanism that
regulates the amount of smoothing produced by a synthesizer to allow ex-
ploration of the utility-risk trade-offs.
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6 Supplementary material A: Within Pattern
Density Plots of County Labels among the
Synthesizers
Figure 6 to Figure 14 are within pattern distribution plots of the county label
synthesized from the DPMPM, DP-Areal synthesizers and the original data
distribution, from Pattern 5 to Pattern 40.
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Figure 6: Counties in Pattern 5 to Pattern 8.
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Figure 7: Counties in Pattern 9 to Pattern 12.
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Figure 8: Counties in Pattern 13 to Pattern 16.
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Figure 9: Counties in Pattern 17 to Pattern 20.
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Figure 10: Counties in Pattern 21 to Pattern 24.
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Figure 11: Counties in Pattern 25 to Pattern 28.
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Figure 12: Counties in Pattern 29 to Pattern 32.
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Figure 13: Counties in Pattern 33 to Pattern 36.
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Figure 14: Counties in Pattern 37 to Pattern 40.
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7 Supplementary material B: Identification
Disclosure Risk Comparisons under Par-
tially Observed Patterns
Figure 15 and Figure 16 are histograms of identification disclosure risks for
the DPMPM, DP-Areal and Maximum (from the original data) for the cases
where only a subset of variables in the pattern are published.
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Figure 15: Known variables: gender. Histogram of expected risks under
the maximum risk scenario. Vertical lines include the min, mean, and max
among the m = 20 synthetic datasets; dashed for DPMPM, and dotted for
DP-areal.
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Figure 16: Known variables: gender and age. Histogram of expected
risks under the maximum risk scenario. Vertical lines include the min, mean,
and max among the m = 20 synthetic datasets; dashed for DPMPM, and
dotted for DP-areal.
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